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INTRODUCTION 
Policymakers have long invoked the concept of a “terminating 
access monopoly” to inform communications policy. Roughly speaking, 
the concept holds that a consumer-facing network provider, no matter 
how small or how subject to retail competition, generally possesses 
monopoly power vis-à-vis third-party senders of communications traffic 
to its customers. Over the past fifteen years, regulators and advocates 
have routinely cited that concern to justify regulatory intervention in a 
variety of contexts where the regulated party may or may not have 
possessed market power in any relevant retail market. For example, it has 
been invoked to support regulation of interconnection arrangements 
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between any two voice-service providers, no matter how small;1 of 
peering arrangements between the Internet’s constituent networks;2 and 
of access by content providers to the networks of residential Internet 
service providers (“ISPs”), even when ISPs are small and subject to 
competition.3 Most recently, in its 2015 Open Internet Order, the FCC 
employed the related “gatekeeper” concept as a basis for its net neutrality 
rules, though it relied on independent policy concerns as well.4 
 
 1. E.g., Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, CC Dkt. No. 01-92, 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 4685, para. 24 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 
Intercarrier Compensation NPRM] (“Originating carriers generally have little practical means 
of affecting the called party’s choice of access provider, and the called party’s [carrier] may 
take advantage of the situation by charging excessive terminating rates . . . . To address the 
terminating access monopoly problem, the Commission generally has determined that carriers 
should not be permitted unilaterally to impose termination charges that are not subject to 
regulation.”); Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, CC Dkt. No. 01-92, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd. 9610, para. 133 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 
Intercarrier Compensation NPRM] (“[L]ocal carriers possess monopoly power over 
terminating access. As a result, [competitive entrants] often impose access charges that far 
exceed the regulated access charges of incumbent [carriers].”). 
 2. E.g., Letter from New America Foundation et al. to Assistant Att’y Gen. Christine 
Varney and FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski et al., Application of Comcast Corp., General 
Electric Company, and NBC Universal Inc. for Consent to Assign License or Transfer Control 
of Licensees, Dkt. No. 10-56, 3 (filed Dec. 8, 2010) (“Comcast has a terminating access 
monopoly; no other provider can directly provide transmission to Comcast’s subscribers,” and 
“the nature of the [paid peering] dispute [between Comcast and Level 3] suggests that every 
residential broadband network owner has the incentive to drive down its own costs in this 
way . . . .”). 
 3. E.g., Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, GN. Dkt. No. 09-
191, WC Dkt. No. 07-52, Report & Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, paras. 24 & n.66, 32 n.87 
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order] (as a “terminating monopolist,” a “broadband 
provider could force edge providers to pay inefficiently high fees because that broadband 
provider is typically an edge provider’s only option for reaching a particular end user,” and 
“[b]ecause broadband providers have the ability to act as gatekeepers even in the absence of 
market power with respect to end users, we need not conduct a [retail] market power analysis” 
to justify regulating such fees), aff’d in relevant part and reversed on other grounds, Verizon 
v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Because all end users generally access the 
Internet through a single broadband provider, that provider functions as a ‘terminating 
monopolist’ with power to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ with respect to edge providers that might seek 
to reach its end-user subscribers”) (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted). See 
also FED. TRADE COMM’N, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 77–79 (2007), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/broadband-connectivity-competition-
policy/v070000report.pdf (discussing “the terminating access monopoly problem”) 
(capitalization omitted). 
 4. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Dkt. No. 14-28, Report & 
Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, para. 80 n.130 (2015) 
[hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order] (“[The] unique ‘gatekeeper’ position of broadband 
providers in combination with other realities about broadband availability and access affects 
broadband providers’ incentives and abilities to harm the open nature of the Internet. . . . [T]he 
Commission’s discussion of these terms [i.e., “gatekeeper” and “terminating access 
monopoly”] is especially important in combination with switching costs and limited retail 
broadband competition for fixed broadband. With respect to mobile, the presence of some 
additional retail competition is not enough to alter our conclusion here.”). The Commission 
also predicated its net neutrality rules on justifications independent of any need to avoid 
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Despite the centrality of the terminating access monopoly to modern 
communications policy, there is surprisingly little academic literature on 
that concept as it applies to current regulatory debates.5 This essay seeks 
to fill that gap by exploring the various settings in which the concept 
does, or does not, help explain market dynamics in the communications 
sector. We conclude that the terminating access monopoly phenomenon, 
strictly understood, does not itself generally threaten market failures 
except in very limited circumstances. As we explain, the phenomenon 
could threaten inefficient outcomes only where, because of the 
underlying market context, the interconnecting provider or its customer 
has a particularized need to reach the customer set of the terminating 
access provider, and even then, market forces might correct any problem 
without regulatory intervention. 
This is a narrow thesis. Even though the terminating access 
monopoly may not itself give rise to widespread market failures, 
ordinary market-power dynamics may independently justify regulatory 
intervention. For example, to address monopsony concerns in the video 
programming marketplace, regulators have long sought to limit the 
aggregate share of eyeball customers nationwide that any given cable 
provider may serve.6 Just as important, policymakers may have valid 
reasons for intervening in interconnection arrangements wholly unrelated 
to market power, particularly if bargaining impasses would otherwise 
threaten the positive externalities associated with a ubiquitous 
communications platform, such as the Internet or the public telephone 
system. This essay is not concerned with those issues; it is concerned 
instead with whether and when the terminating access monopoly 
concept, strictly construed, should independently inform whether such 
intervention is appropriate. 
 
 
conventional market failures (whether arising from a terminating access monopoly or 
otherwise), relying as much on the positive externalities it attributed to maintaining the 
traditional structure of the Internet platform. See id. at paras. 76–77. 
 5. The two best-known recent treatments of the issue by academic economists have both 
taken the form of regulatory advocacy submitted on behalf of particular companies in the 
FCC’s Open Internet proceedings. See Andres Lerner & Janusz Ordover, The “Terminating 
Access Monopoly” Theory and the Provision of Broadband Internet Access, in Verizon Ex 
Parte, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Dkt. No. 14-28 (Jan. 15, 2015); 
Nicholas Economides, Broadband Openness Rules Are Fully Justified by Economic Research, 
84 COMMS. & STRATEGIES 1, 2, 7–8 (2011) (sponsored and submitted by Google; addressing 
the terminating access monopoly in passing). As discussed in note 15, infra, older academic 
treatments focused on a mobile-termination-charge issue that arose outside of the United States 
because of foreign regulatory choices that U.S. regulators have avoided. 
 6. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(f) (2013); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); 
Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also infra 
note 32 and accompanying text. 
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I. DEFINING THE ISSUE 
Let us begin by distinguishing the terminating access monopoly 
concept from more general market power concerns that can arise in any 
commercial setting. The concept arises from a theoretical model of 
“competitive bottlenecks” in which users on one side of a two-sided 
platform are single-homed—that is, they can be reached for the most part 
only through that platform and not feasibly through alternative 
platforms.7 Under the model, if a market participant on the other side of 
the platform “wishes to interact with [a user] on the single-homing side, 
[it] has no choice but to deal with that [user’s] chosen platform,” and the 
platform thus has “monopoly power over providing access to [its] single-
homing customers,” whether or not the platform faces competition for 
those single-homing customers.8 The terminating access monopoly 
construct is an application of this general theory of competitive 
bottlenecks to the communications marketplace.9 According to the 
construct, any consumer-facing communications provider (1) enjoys 
monopoly power vis-à-vis interconnecting communications providers by 
virtue of the termination functions it provides for its single-homed 
customers, even where (2) the provider faces retail competition for those 
customers and (3) does not serve a substantial share of consumers overall 
(including those outside its geographic footprint). 
Each element of this definition is critical to untangling the 
terminating access monopoly concept from related but distinct market 
dynamics. First, use of the term “monopoly” implies that a provider of 
service to single-homed customers enjoys more than mere bargaining 
leverage when dividing up economic surplus with interconnecting 
providers that wish to send communications traffic (such as voice signals 
or video content) to those customers.10 Instead, the provider is said to 
exercise monopoly power vis-à-vis those providers in some properly 
defined market, accompanied by welfare-reducing deadweight losses. 
This distinction is important because disparate bargaining power is 
commonplace and is not generally thought to pose policy concerns unless 
it deters at least some economically efficient activity or otherwise 
reduces consumer welfare. 
 
 7. See, e.g., Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 
668 (2006). 
 8. Id. at 669; see also JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 184–85 (2000). 
 9. See Lerner & Ordover, supra note 5, at 15–16. 
 10. We are using the “interconnection” concept broadly to include any third-party 
delivery of communications traffic to a consumer-facing network provider en route to that 
provider’s customers. The term thus applies to ESPN’s satellite-based delivery of content to a 
cable head-end no less than to Netflix’s delivery of streaming-video traffic via direct peering 
between Netflix’s content delivery network (“CDN”) and an ISP’s’ local network. 
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Second, in the usual account, a terminating access monopoly is said 
to exist even if the consumer-facing provider faces substantial retail 
competition (i.e., competition for consumers) from rival providers.11 For 
example, around the turn of the millennium, policymakers asserted that 
new entrants in local telephone markets—known as “competitive local 
exchange carriers” or “CLECs”—enjoyed such a monopoly even though 
they competed with much larger incumbent LECs in major metropolitan 
areas, as discussed below in Section II. Of course, the mere fact of retail 
competition does not mean that switching costs in the retail market are 
low. We will assume for purposes of this discussion that switching costs 
among competing retail providers are generally significant but not 
insuperable. 
Third, and similarly, policymakers have applied the terminating 
access monopoly construct to providers with small as well as large 
geographic footprints. Thus, a provider limited to a single metropolitan 
area—or even to a rural town—has long been assumed to enjoy a 
terminating access monopoly in negotiating to accept traffic hand-offs 
from interconnecting providers, even if those providers send the vast 
bulk of their traffic to consumers in other geographic locations served by 
other providers.12 
These last two points are important to bear in mind throughout the 
ensuing discussion. In questioning the role of this specialized 
“terminating access monopoly” concept, we are not casting doubt on 
whether plain-vanilla monopoly problems could arise if a given provider 
tied up a dominant share of end users overall. For example, the Justice 
Department did not need to rely on any terminating access monopoly 
concept to block the WorldCom-Sprint merger in 2000, which threatened 
to tip the Internet backbone market to a monopoly by concentrating an 
enormous share of the Internet’s transit business in one provider.13 And 
as discussed below, policymakers need not rely on any such concept to 
justify limiting the total share of “eyeballs” any given provider may 
serve nationwide.14 
 
 
 
 11. E.g., 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, at paras. 24 & n.66, 32 n.87; 2005 
Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 24 (explaining that all local exchange 
carriers, whether incumbent or upstart, have monopoly power with respect to terminating 
access to their respective customer sets); 2001 Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, supra note 
1, at para. 133 (same). 
 12. E.g., 2005 Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 24; 2001 
Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, supra note 1, at para. 133. 
 13. See Complaint, United States v. WorldCom, No. 00-CV-1526 (D.D.C. filed June 26, 
2000), http://www.justice.gov/file/516831/download.  
 14. See infra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing congressional mandate for 
horizontal ownership restrictions on cable providers). 
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II. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE TERMINATING ACCESS 
MONOPOLY THEORY IN VOICE-NETWORK INTERCONNECTION 
ARRANGEMENTS 
The terminating access monopoly concept first assumed prominence 
in the 1990s and early 2000s with the emergence of competition in voice 
telephone markets.15  In the United States, the concept gained currency as 
fixed-line CLECs began assessing inefficiently high terminating access 
charges on interconnecting carriers for the delivery of long-distance calls 
over the public switched telephone network: 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
Because CLECs were new entrants rather than monopolists, observers 
cited these inefficiently high charges as examples of a market failure 
 
 15. The early scholarship on this topic focused on a phenomenon that arose in much of 
the world outside of the United States: the imposition of excessive termination charges by 
mobile providers for delivering calls to their subscribers. See generally Julian Wright, 
Competition and Termination in Cellular Networks (Jan. 25, 2000) (unpublished working 
paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=201988; Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, Mobile Network 
Competition, Customer Ignorance and Fixed-to-Mobile Call Prices, 12 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 
301 (2000). The United States avoided this phenomenon by (inter alia) denying mobile 
providers any regulatory entitlement to collect terminating access charges of any kind. See 
Petitions of Sprint PCS and AT&T Corp. for Declaratory Ruling Regarding CMRS Access 
Charges, WT Dkt. No. 01-316, Declaratory Ruling, 17 FCC Rcd. 13,192 (2002), appeal 
dismissed sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.3d 692 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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endemic to interconnection arrangements in network industries.16 
On close inspection, however, the CLEC access charge 
phenomenon arose as much from a regulatory problem as from a market 
failure. CLECs were able to charge inefficiently high rates in part 
because, under the existing access charge regime, each long-distance 
carrier was required to interconnect with them and pay them whatever 
rates were set forth in their tariffs, which regulators had not closely 
scrutinized for any legitimate cost basis.17 As a result, the CLECs’ 
customers had little or no reason to discipline their carriers’ assessment 
of such charges. Indeed, those customers affirmatively benefited because 
high intercarrier charges implicitly subsidized their own low retail rates. 
To make matters worse, federal law kept even the calling parties that 
triggered these inefficiently high charges from internalizing the costs of 
this arrangement. In particular, it forced long-distance providers to 
recover their costs on a geographically averaged basis from all their 
customers uniformly and thus forbade them to raise prices specifically on 
the calls subject to unusually high terminating fees.18 
Suppose, however, that this field were completely unregulated—
suppose that long-distance carriers were not required to interconnect with 
any given CLEC if they did not wish to pay whatever access charges the 
CLEC demanded, and suppose they could pass through to their own 
customers whatever charges they wished. At first blush, one might think 
that a large long-distance company’s threat of non-interconnection would 
keep a fledgling CLEC from trying to charge it monopoly-level 
termination rates—or perhaps anything at all. After all, in a hypothetical 
game of chicken between the two carriers, the tiny CLEC would have 
more to lose than the huge long-distance company if their respective 
customers begin complaining that they could not talk to their friends. In 
fact, however, the long-distance carrier might well be willing to 
interconnect and pay the CLEC’s inefficiently high access charges if it 
could pass those charges through to the specific customers who place 
calls to that CLEC’s customers.19 By so doing, the long-distance 
 
 16. See generally JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL 
CROSSROADS: TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 258–59 (2d 
ed. 2013) (providing fuller discussion of CLEC access charge controversy). The FCC 
responded in 2001 by capping the level of terminating access charges CLECs could impose. 
See Access Charge Reform, CC Dkt. No. 96-262, Seventh Report & Order and Further Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd, 9923 (2001). 
 17. The FCC appeared to recognize this point when it explained that its 2001 cap on 
termination charges was needed “to prevent use of the regulatory process to impose excessive 
access charges.”  Access Charge Reform, supra note 16, at para. 2. 
 18. See id. at para. 31 (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 254(g)). 
 19. We are making several simplifying assumptions in this example. First, we assume 
that the CLEC imposes uniformly high access charges on all interconnecting long-distance 
carriers so that, if every such carrier passes 100% of the charges through to its customers, none 
of them will face any competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the others. Second, we assume 
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company could recover its incremental costs and minimize transaction 
costs (such as handling consumer complaints about blocked calls and 
negotiating with individual CLECs about access-charge levels). Indeed, 
it appears that, in some circumstances, international calling arrangements 
have worked in this manner: long-distance carriers have paid exorbitant 
“settlement rates” for terminating access to foreign carriers and have 
passed those rates through to their end users.20 
Of course, these high terminating access charges produce inefficient 
outcomes: they ultimately require the calling party to pay a monopoly 
price in order to reach the terminating carrier’s customers, thus creating 
deadweight losses in the form of inefficiently reduced output (i.e., fewer 
and shorter calls to those customers). Such inefficient arrangements may 
nonetheless be stable if the called parties are genuinely single-homed and 
if they remain loyal to the terminating carrier because that carrier shares 
the monopoly profits with them indirectly, in the form of subsidized 
retail rates. The terminating access monopoly may thus pose a legitimate 
public policy challenge in this context. 
As discussed below, however, it is hazardous to extrapolate from 
this scenario to interconnection arrangements among communications 
networks in general. The reason is that the calling party in a conventional 
voice call (or similar person-to-person communication) occupies a 
unique position. Typically, he wishes to reach one particular person, and 
no other person is a close substitute for purposes of that communication. 
For each individual voice call, the “market” in which the calling party 
participates is a market for access to a single person. Thus, by definition, 
whatever carrier the called party has chosen is a gatekeeper for 100% of 
the relevant market. As we discuss next, that key characteristic is absent 
in most other interconnection contexts. 
III. CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE TERMINATING ACCESS MONOPOLY  
PLAYS LITTLE EVIDENT ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING 
CONSUMER-FACING NETWORK PROVIDERS 
If the terminating access monopoly threatens inefficient outcomes 
whenever a consumer-facing network provider routes incoming traffic to 
 
perfect information: the calling parties know that and why they are paying higher prices to 
reach the called parties. Third, we assume that the called parties are genuinely single-homed, 
in that a calling party cannot feasibly reach them except through the single network that 
charges monopoly terminating access rates. Of course, this third assumption was more justified 
in the late 1990s than it is today, when most people subscribe to multiple voice networks 
through which they can be reached (e.g., a cellphone as well as a home or office phone). 
 20. See LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 8, at 179, 184; see also Executive Office of the 
President, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2013 Section 1377 Review on Compliance 
with Telecomm. Trade Agreements 12 (Apr. 2013) (noting efforts to curb such rates through 
international trade agreements). 
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its single-homed customers, one would expect to see many different 
examples of small competitive providers charging very high rates to the 
senders of that incoming traffic. Tellingly, that phenomenon rarely arises 
outside of the voice-interconnection context. 
To take one example, consider the marketplace for programming 
sold to multichannel video programming distributors (“MVPDs”), such 
as conventional cable companies, fiber overbuilders (e.g., Verizon FiOS 
or RCN), and satellite television providers. An MVPD’s customers are 
typically single-homed: a single household within Cox Cable’s footprint 
generally does not subscribe to both Cox and some alternative MVPD 
such as DirecTV; it subscribes to one or the other. And like other 
MVPDs, Cox receives the programming bound for its subscribers from a 
variety of content sources (such as HBO and Discovery), typically via 
intermediate satellite or fiber-optic transmissions. If the terminating 
access monopoly threatened endemic market failures for any unregulated 
exchange of communications traffic bound for any given provider’s 
single-homed customers, one would expect each of those MVPDs to 
charge content providers inefficiently high rates for rights of “access” to 
the MVPD’s customers. In fact, the consideration often flows in the 
opposite direction, from MVPDs to interconnecting content providers21: 
 
FIGURE 2 
  
 
 21. See, e.g., Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, MB 
Dkt. No. 10-71, Report & Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd. 
3351, para. 2 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Retransmission Consent Order] (noting that 
“broadcasters have increasingly sought and received monetary compensation [from MVPDs] 
in exchange for retransmission consent”). 
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And the smaller the MVPD is, the more it must typically pay for the 
privilege of routing that incoming content to its single-homed end 
users—a clear indication that the terminating access monopoly, which is 
by definition indifferent to a provider’s size, plays little or no role in 
these commercial dynamics. Indeed, MVPDs have cited the increasing 
size of these payments in urging Congress and the FCC to regulate this 
marketplace on their behalf.22 
The inapplicability of the terminating access monopoly to MVPDs 
stems from the difference between point-to-point services such as 
telephony and point-to-multipoint services such as video entertainment. 
To achieve its purpose, a telephone call must reach a particular recipient, 
and the calling party will thus pay supracompetitive rates to reach that 
recipient. A television show, in contrast, is targeted not at a specific 
individual, but at a mass audience. As a result, the total number of 
viewers reached is more important than the ability to reach any particular 
customer.23 Although content providers would clearly prefer to reach as 
many viewers as possible, they are generally free to forgo the revenue 
that would have been generated by a particular customer if the 
terminating access provider sets the price for reaching that customer too 
high. 
To take another example, consider the case of small and mid-sized 
ISPs, each of which may serve thousands or millions of single-homed 
consumers.24 If each small ISP’s terminating access monopoly were 
 
 22. See, e.g., Petition for Rulemaking from Time Warner Cable Inc. et al., Amendment of 
the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, MB Dkt. No. 10-71 (filed Mar. 9, 
2010), http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=6015543391. For the most part, the FCC has 
declined to intervene substantively in this area on grounds of insufficient statutory authority. 
See Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, MB Dkt. No. 10-
71, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd. 2718, para. 18 (2011); cf. 2014 
Retransmission Consent Order, supra note 21.  
       In the case of broadcast programming, Congress has set up an elaborate system under 
which cable companies need not bargain with content owners and may instead avail 
themselves of a “compulsory copyright,” but they must nonetheless bargain with broadcast 
stations (which often act as close proxies for their affiliated programming networks) for rights 
of “retransmission consent.” See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 335–39. 
Although the compulsory copyright and retransmission consent provisions complicate the 
economic picture, the ensuing market dynamics are similar to those that any MVPD confronts 
in the unregulated market for non-broadcast programming, such as that offered by HBO and 
Discovery. In both contexts, MVPDs must enter into market-based negotiations for the right to 
send specified content to their subscribers. 
 23. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New 
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 253–58 (2002); accord Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 
240 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable 
Television Consumer Prot. and Competition Act of 1992, MM Dkt. No. 92-264, Third Report 
and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 19,098, 19,114–18 paras. 40–50 (1999)). 
 24. To give the terminating access monopoly concept the benefit of the doubt in the 
broadband Internet context, we are treating fixed-line residential service as the relevant 
market, and we are thus treating retail customers as “single-homed” if they have one fixed-line 
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material to its negotiations with other Internet-based networks, one 
would expect each of those ISPs to extract inefficiently high rates from 
the interconnecting backbone providers and content delivery networks 
that deliver incoming Internet traffic bound for the ISP’s customers. In 
fact, such ISPs typically charge little or nothing for such access to their 
customers. To the contrary, the money often flows in the opposite 
direction: any ISP that is not a Tier 1 network typically pays third-party 
networks for transit services, which include the service of terminating 
traffic to that ISP’s customers.25 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
 
Of course, the more eyeballs a given ISP serves, the greater its size 
and scope is likely to be within the Internet peering marketplace, and the 
less likely it is to pay transit providers for access to any given Internet 
content. Indeed, the largest ISPs have succeeded in charging some 
 
connection into the home, whether or not they may also have Internet connections via their 
mobile devices or office computers. This is because any problems associated with terminating 
access are minimized if retail customers maintain multiple fungible connections. LAFFONT & 
TIROLE, supra note 8, at 215. 
 25. See Peyman Faratin, David Clark et al., The Growing Complexity of Internet 
Interconnection, 72 COMM. & STRATEGIES 51, 63 (2008); see also Stanley M. Besen & Mark 
A. Israel, The Evolution of Internet Interconnection from Hierarchy to “Mesh”: Implications 
for Government Regulation, 25 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 235, 243–44 (2013). A Tier 1 network is 
a network of sufficient global size and scope that it does not purchase transit services from any 
other network and peers with each other Tier 1 network. 
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interconnecting networks—such as Level 3 and Netflix’s proprietary 
content distribution network (“CDN”)—for sending large amounts of 
incoming streaming video traffic to the ISPs’ customer base.26 But there 
is little evidence so far that these charges are inefficiently high, such that 
they could cause deadweight losses to the Internet ecosystem; only then 
could they suggest a monopoly problem.27 More importantly, only the 
largest ISPs appear capable of charging interconnecting CDNs anything 
at all for access to their customer base. This fact reaffirms that any 
negotiating leverage such ISPs may have originates from their size—and 
thus from traditional sources of bargaining power—not from the size-
agnostic phenomenon of the terminating access monopoly. 
In sum, these examples underscore that the terminating access 
monopoly does not play a central role in all unregulated interconnection 
arrangements. Instead, whatever role it plays is a contingent phenomenon 
that arises only under certain traffic patterns and market structures. 
IV. THE LIMITED EXPLANATORY VALUE OF THE TERMINATING ACCESS 
MONOPOLY CONSTRUCT 
Our discussion so far suggests the following: any consumer-facing 
network provider has, in some sense, “monopoly” or “gatekeeper” power 
over access to its single-homed customers, but that concept is not 
particularly edifying as a tool for understanding what factors actually 
shape interconnection arrangements. A small rural MVPD/ISP may be 
the gatekeeper for access to its customer set, but HBO is likewise the 
gatekeeper for access to its programming, and Netflix is the gatekeeper 
for access to its streaming video service. The rural MVPD/ISP’s 
possession of a terminating access monopoly does not itself tell us very 
much about how it will fare in its negotiations with those other 
gatekeepers. All we know is that, despite the MVPD/ISP’s gatekeeper 
status, it is very unlikely to earn monopoly rents from any 
 
 26. See, e.g., NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 287–90; 2015 Open Internet 
Order, supra note 4, at paras. 196–205. 
 27. Large volumes of incoming traffic impose costs on ISP networks. ISPs could 
efficiently recover those costs by charging higher retail rates to their heaviest data users or, 
alternatively, by charging wholesale rates to the networks that offload high volumes of 
unidirectional traffic. Suppose that, in the latter scenario, the interconnecting network that pays 
these wholesale charges is a CDN operated by a subscription streaming-video provider such as 
Netflix. Ultimately, the video provider will pass some or all of the charges through to its 
subscribers in the form of higher rates for its service, and it can vary those rates explicitly 
depending on each subscriber’s ISP and the wholesale rates that ISP charges for 
interconnection. Under either scenario, the costs caused by the extra streaming video traffic 
will be paid by the end users that benefit from that traffic and cause it to be transmitted. There 
is no reason in principle why either of these cost-recovery models is inherently more efficient 
than the other. See generally Besen & Israel, supra note 25, at 243–44. Certainly the mere 
existence of wholesale charges for access to an ISP’s customer base is not evidence of a 
market failure. 
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interconnection deal. 
Borrowing from the economic literature, it may be useful to employ 
a bilateral monopoly framework to analyze commercial negotiations in 
these circumstances.28 Under that framework, the monopolist on each 
side of a transaction bargains for a greater share of the economic surplus 
that would be created if the two can agree upon terms. Each has an 
incentive to strike a deal because otherwise no surplus is created and 
each side comes away with nothing. But one side may have more to lose 
than the other from delays in negotiations, and the other side can exploit 
that fact to win a larger share of the surplus. In the interconnection 
contexts discussed above, several familiar factors influence bargaining 
outcomes, and each is exogenous to the terminating access monopoly 
construct. 
First, interconnecting entities that wish to deliver unusually high-
value traffic may successfully extract fees from (rather than paying them 
to) a consumer-facing network provider because, as the negotiating 
parties understand, withholding the traffic from the consumer-facing 
provider will diminish the value that consumers attach to the network 
provider’s service. For example, ESPN typically enjoys a stronger 
negotiating position than the Tennis Channel vis-à-vis MVPDs, and it 
successfully charges MVPDs substantial fees for access to its content. 
Again, the fact that consideration often flows from the supposed 
terminating access monopolist to the interconnecting supplier of 
incoming communications traffic underscores the limited explanatory 
value of the terminating monopoly construct. 
Second, if the consumer-facing network provider faces little retail 
competition, that fact will affect negotiations in its favor, because the 
sender of communications traffic will perceive that the network provider 
could credibly threaten to hold out for a better deal without losing 
substantial retail revenues. In contrast, if the network provider does face 
retail competition, the sending party can try to exploit that fact by 
encouraging the network provider’s customers to incur the switching 
costs of defecting to an alternative network provider—as broadcasters 
routinely do when they reach negotiating impasses with given MVPDs. 
These dynamics, too, cut against any heavy explanatory emphasis on the 
terminating access monopoly, which is said to exist irrespective of retail 
 
 28. For the classic exposition of this issue, see Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a 
Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97, 97–100 (1982). See generally ABHINAY MUTHOO, 
BARGAINING THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS (1999). Although “bilateral monopoly” analysis 
can shed light on the dynamics of interconnection agreements, our use of that term does not 
imply that the parties on either side of such agreements (e.g., a small competitive ISP and 
HBO) are conventional “monopolists” in any well-defined antitrust market. For example, HBO 
obviously competes for viewers with other programming networks even though it serves as a 
gatekeeper for access to its own programming. 
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competition. 
Third, even if the consumer-facing network provider faces no 
competition and enjoys a complete retail monopoly within its footprint, it 
will enjoy greater or lesser bargaining leverage depending on the total 
number of customers it serves. For example, a large MVPD/ISP is more 
likely than a small one to strike favorable terms with a content provider 
or some other interconnecting entity because it can credibly threaten to 
impose costly delays on access to its large customer set. For example, a 
cable programmer is likely to be far more nervous about losing even 
temporary access to 25% of the nation’s eyeballs. Again, this 
consideration has nothing to do with the mere fact that the consumer-
facing network provider serves single-homed customers, and thus has 
little in particular to do with the terminating access monopoly. It relates 
instead to the aggregate share of eyeballs the provider can claim 
nationwide. 
In contrast, if a consumer-facing network provider’s customers 
account for only a very small share of the overall market that the 
interconnecting entity wishes to reach, the network provider may have 
little negotiating power because a bargaining impasse might have only a 
de minimis effect on the interconnecting entity. By analogy, every parent 
is a “gatekeeper” for access by magazine publishers to the children in her 
household. But this does not mean that each parent enjoys 
monopoly/monopsony power vis-à-vis child-magazine publishers, 
because the relevant market from the publisher’s perspective is the 
nationwide set of potential child subscribers, not the set of children 
within a given household. 
These considerations suggest a broader principle. A network 
provider’s gatekeeper role could enable it to earn monopoly rents and 
produce inefficient market outcomes only if, among other preconditions, 
its set of single-homed customers is material to the broader market that 
the traffic-delivering entity wishes to reach. That precondition often is 
not met. For example, Netflix or a cable programming channel need not 
reach 100% of American households to succeed, and either could easily 
balk at any request by a tiny MVPD/ISP to pay high fees for access to its 
small customer base. Of course, even if this precondition is met—even if 
the MVPD/ISP acts as a gatekeeper for a substantial share of a given 
market—market forces might produce efficient outcomes anyway. For 
example, even a large MVPD/ISP probably could not succeed in 
charging inefficiently high rates to providers of popular content for 
access to its customer base if it faces strong retail competition and the 
content provider has independent relationships with consumers.29 
 
 29. See, e.g., Lerner & Ordover, supra note 5, at 17–23 (arguing that a content provider’s 
independent relationship with end users, combined with retail mobile broadband competition, 
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Viewed from this perspective, voice-network interconnection 
appears as a special case in which the terminating access monopoly 
would sometimes play a central role in an unregulated market. Again, in 
the absence of regulation, any terminating voice carrier, large or small, 
may succeed in charging inefficiently high rates for access to its single-
homed customers if the calling party’s carrier can pass those rates 
through to the calling party itself. The reason is that, in any given call, 
the calling party has a particularized need to reach a given individual at a 
given number, and the terminating carrier (with whom the calling party 
typically has no relationship) controls access to that entire “market.” 
This is not to say that this market dynamic is unique to the PSTN. 
There may also be other special cases in which even a small consumer-
facing network provider could exploit its terminating access monopoly to 
produce inefficient market outcomes. In theory, that concern could arise 
whenever (1) a retail provider controls exclusive access to a potential 
recipient of a communication and could feasibly condition that access on 
the receipt of a termination payment, (2) a mechanism exists for the 
originator of the communication to make that payment either directly or 
indirectly, and (3) the originator has a strong need to reach the particular 
recipient in question and thus would be willing to pay supracompetitive 
rates to do so. For example, if these conditions are all met, even a small 
over-the-top VoIP provider with no physical network could theoretically 
impose inefficiently high access charges on interconnecting VoIP 
providers.30 Moreover, in a variation on a classic hold-out problem, a 
small MVPD/ISP might be able to extract inefficiently high payments 
from a content provider if, for some reason, the content provider’s 
business plan requires access to all (rather than most) consumers 
nationwide and the MVPD/ISP can credibly threaten that plan by 
refusing to deal. But these are special cases; they are not endemic to 
interconnection negotiations in the communications marketplace. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the terminating access monopoly plays a major role in the 
communications ecosystem only in narrowly defined circumstances. Its 
importance is highly contingent on other market facts, and policymakers 
should thus be wary of invoking it as a generalized basis for broadly 
intervening in any marketplace involving consumer-facing network 
providers. 
 
would keep a mobile provider from exploiting any terminating access monopoly vis-à-vis the 
content provider). 
 30. In reality, these conditions will rarely be met. For example, multi-homing is 
increasingly common, and few people would agree to be single-homed customers of a VoIP 
provider that threatened to block calls from non-paying interconnecting providers. 
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We repeat what we said at the outset: this is a narrow thesis. There 
may be a variety of sound analytical bases independent of any 
terminating access monopoly for regulatory oversight of relationships 
between consumer-facing network providers and interconnecting 
suppliers of voice, Internet content, and other communications traffic. 
First, conventional market power concerns might well justify caps on any 
given provider’s market share. For example, policymakers may 
reasonably seek to maintain competitive equilibrium within the 
marketplace for Internet peering and transit, a key basis for the rejection 
of the WorldCom-Sprint merger in 2000.31 Or they may wish to address 
monopsony concerns in the sale of cable programming, the basis for 
regulatory limits on a given cable provider’s share of subscribers 
nationwide.32 Again, however, these concerns have nothing to do with 
conventional notions of a terminating access monopoly, which are 
indifferent to a terminating provider’s size. 
Second, because of network externalities, a given network of 
networks—whether the public telephone system or the Internet—may 
serve as an optimally valuable platform for innovation and economic 
growth only if all constituent networks are in fact interconnected.33 This 
public good rationale may well justify regulatory intervention if and 
when necessary to avoid negotiating impasses and potential 
balkanization of such platforms. For that reason, regulators may wish to 
scrutinize, and perhaps intervene in, (1) VoIP-to-VoIP interconnection as 
voice networks transition from their historic circuit-switched format to 
the Internet Protocol, (2) the relations between “eyeball” ISPs and 
content providers (or CDNs), and (3) peering negotiations between Tier 
1 networks.34 But any regulatory intervention should be tethered to these 
concerns. Invocation of the terminating access monopoly concept in 
these contexts is likely to confuse the policy debate more than clarify it. 
 
 
 31. See Complaint, United States v. WorldCom, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 32. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(f) (2013). Although the D.C. Circuit has twice rejected the 
FCC’s various rationales for capping cable ownership shares at 30% (see, e.g., Comcast Corp. 
v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009)), that is a dispute over details; there is no dispute that 
some limit is appropriate (and required by statute). 
 33. See, e.g., BRETT FRISCHMAN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED 
RESOURCES 331 (2012); Timothy F. Bresnahan & M. Trajtenberg, General Purpose 
Technologies: “Engines of Growth”?, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83 (1995). 
 34. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 16, at 281–87 (discussing challenges of 
the IP transition for voice networks), 290–93 (discussing concerns about the risk that Tier 1 
bargaining impasses could theoretically lead to at least partial and temporary Internet 
fragmentation). 
